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Diversity Jurisdiction Over Alien
Corporations
Diversity jurisdiction has long been controversial.1 Argu-
ments have been made for its elimination,2 alteration,3 retention,4
' See, e.g., P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1053-59 (2d ed. 1973); Frank, Historical Bases of
the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1948); Moore & Weckstein,
Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1964); Phillips &
Christenson, The Historical and Legal Background of the Diversity Jurisdiction, 46 A.B.A.
J. 959 (1960).
2 The leading advocate for elimination of diversity jurisdiction was Justice Frankfurter.
See Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 53-60 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 650-51 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United
States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 520-26 (1928). This position has been advo-
cated by other judges, e.g., Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D.
231, 236-37 (1976); Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 62 A.B.A. J. 443,
444 (1976), as well as by scholars, e.g., Federal Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: Hear-
ings on S. 2094, S. 2389 & H.R. 9622 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 44-63 (1978) (state-
ment and testimony of Prof. Charles A. Wright) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Hearings]; Clark,
Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 19 A.B.A. J. 499 (1933); Currie,
The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (pts. 1 & 2), 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 268
(1968); Kurland, The Distribution of Judicial Power Between National and State Courts,
42 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 159 (1959); Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive
Side Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARv. L. REV. 963 (1979). There has
also been legislative support for eliminating diversity jurisdiction. E.g., S. 2389, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 28, 30-33 (1978) (abolishing diversity jurisdiction except for alien-
age and statutory interpleader); H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 4992-5000
(1978); S. REP. No. 691, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930).
3 The leading proposal for limiting and altering diversity jurisdiction is the AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY]. Supporting the ALI proposals are Field,
Diversity of Citizenship: A Response to Judge Wright, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 489 (1967), and
Wright, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: The American Law Institute Proposals, 26
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185, 194-98 (1969). See also H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 139-
52 (1973) (advocating substantial restrictions on diversity jurisdiction); Friendly, The His-
toric Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REV. 483 (1928) (examining the history of
the diversity grant to provide a basis for determining how far the grant should be re-
stricted); Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 317, 339-55 (1977) (proposing a system of local choice). Congress has also made efforts
to restrict diversity jurisdiction. A bill was introduced to enact the ALI proposal in 1971, S.
1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 117 CONG. REC. 15,071 (1971), and reintroduced two years later, S.
1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 16,658 (1973). See also S. 2094, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 29,266 (1977) (limiting diversity jurisdiction by preventing a plaintiff
from filing in the federal courts of his home state).
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and expansion. In the midst of this general controversy, issues
stemming from the application of the present statutory grant of
diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332,6 remain unresolved. Article
III of the Constitution permits several types of federal diversity
jurisdiction.7 Section 1332 embodies the congressional grant of two
" See, e.g., 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 28-44 (testimony of John P. Frank); 1 J.
MOORE, J. LUCAS, H. FINK, D. WECKSTEIN & J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.6[1]
(2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as MOORE'S]; Frank, Let's Keep Diversity Jurisdiction, 9
FORUM 157 (1973); Frank, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction-An Opposing View, 17 S.C.L.
REv. 677 (1965); Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7 (1963);
Moore & Weckstein, supra note 1; Moore & Wicker, Federal Jurisdiction, 1 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 1 (1973); Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It, 18 A.B.A. J.
433, 437-39 (1932); Parker, Dual Sovereignty and the Federal Courts, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 407,
408-11 (1956).
Legal practitioners appear firmly opposed to limiting diversity jurisdiction. See 1978
Hearings, supra note 2, at 81, 161, 189, 393-412 (statements of several bar associations).
According to Professor Wright, such a position on the part of the bar is rational but selfish
and narrow-minded: "[Lawyers] see it from the perspective of the practitioner. They are
unable to take in the overall perspective of what it does to the entire system and what it
does to the entire corpus of would-be litigants." Id. at 60.
See, e.g., 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 136 (testimony of James W. Moore) (advo-
cating a relaxed standard of review so that after a trial on the merits diversity jurisdiction
could not be challenged "unless a litigant could show that he was actually prejudiced due to
jurisdictional error").
e 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976). Section 1332 reads as follows:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign
state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and
citizens of a State or of different States.
(b) Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a statute of the
United States, where the plaintiff who files the case originally in the Federal courts is
finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less than the sum or value of $10,000, com-
puted without regard to any setoff or counterclaim to which the defendant may be
adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive of interest and costs, the district court may deny
costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the plaintiff.
(c) For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title, a corporation
shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the
State where it has its principal place of business: Provided further, That in any direct
action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability insurance, whether incorpo-
rated or unincorporated, to which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant,
such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of the State of which the insured is a citizen, as
well as of any State by which the insurer has been incorporated and of the State where
it has its principal place of business.
(d) The word "States" as used in this section, includes the Territories, the District
of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1:
The judicial Power shall extend. . . to Controversies between two or more States; -
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of these types by establishing the original jurisdiction of the fed-
eral district courts over actions between "citizens of different
States"8 and between "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects
of a foreign state." Section 1332(c) provides that "a corporation
shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incor-
porated and of the State where it has its principal place of busi-
ness." 10 The federal courts are divided over whether section
1332(c) applies to corporations incorporated in countries other
than the United States.1"
At first glance, the language of section 1332(c) appears appli-
cable to all corporations. Closer examination reveals that signifi-
cant complications may arise if alien corporations are held to come
within its scope. This comment will examine the consequences of
applying section 1332(c) to alien corporations and will demonstrate
that, without clearer authorization from Congress, that provision
should not be applied to alien corporations.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION OVER
CORPORATIONS
Determining the citizenship of natural persons for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction poses few problems. By contrast, Congress
and the courts have struggled to define corporate citizenship since
the original statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction in 1789.12 This
section traces the development of the law of corporate citizenship
down to its present formulation in section 1332.
A. Early Notions of Corporate Citizenship
The law of corporate citizenship originally developed through
common law adjudication. Starting from the premise that a corpo-
ration exists only by virtue of the individuals who own and control
it, early decisions held corporate citizenship to be derivative of the
between a State and Citizens of another State; - between Citizens of different States,
- between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
8 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1976).
Id. § 1332(a)(2).
10 Id. § 1332(c).
'1 See authorities cited in MooRE's, supra note 4, % 0.75[3], at 709.81-.82 and 13 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3628, at 823-29 (1975
& Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. Corporations incorporated in coun-
tries other than the United States will be referred to as alien corporations.
" Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1332 (1976)).
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citizenship of its "members."13 Later decisions left unclear whether
a corporation shared the citizenship of all its shareholders or only
of its officers and directors. 14 Either definition of corporate citizen-
ship, in light of the requirement of complete diversity,-5 severely
limited the ability of a corporation to gain access to federal courts
through diversity jurisdiction.
In 1844, the Supreme Court restricted a corporation's citizen-
ship to its state of incorporation."l The Court later sought to har-
monize this result with the derived-citizenship rule by explaining
that, for purposes of determining a corporation's citizenship, a cor-
poration's shareholders would be deemed to be citizens of its state
of incorporation.17 The state-of-incorporation rule was extended to
alien corporations in 1882.18
From 1844 to 1958, when section 1332(c) was enacted, 9 a cor-
poration was deemed a citizen of the state of its incorporation. 0
During this entire period, Congress did not exercise its prerogative
to define citizenship 2' for corporations except where it limited for-
"3 See, e.g., Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 91 (1809).
14 See, e.g., Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1853); Green,
Corporations as Persons, Citizens, and Possessors of Liberty, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 202, 211-12
(1946); Comment, Limited Partnerships and Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 45 U. CHI. L.
REv. 384, 405-06 (1978).
1" See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (no plaintiff may have the
same citizenship as any defendant). The complete-diversity rule effectively barred a widely
held corporation from suing or being sued in the federal courts. Moore & Weckstein, Corpo-
rations and Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction - A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77
HARv. L. REV. 1426, 1427-28 (1964).
"e Louisville, C. & C.R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
17 Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 326-29 (1853); accord Saint
Louis & S.F. Ry. v. James, 161 U.S. 545, 554-55 (1896). Several commentators have noted
the weakness of this patent fiction. See, e.g., MooRE's, supra note 4, 0.75[3], at 709.80; C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 102 (1976); WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 11, § 3623, at 766; Moore & Weckstein, supra note 15, at 1428-30. Thus a Dela-
ware corporation sued by a citizen of New York would satisfy the diversity requirement
because the suit would be between "citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)
(1976).
S National S.S. Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118, 121 (1882); see also Barrow S.S. Co. v.
Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 106 (1898). See generally MooRE's, supra note 4, T 0.75[3], at 709.80.
An interesting and extensive attack on the constitutionality of this doctrine is found in
McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction (pts. 1-3), 56 HA~v. L. REv. 853, 1090, 1101-03, 1225,
1226 (1943).
19 Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 12, 72 Stat. 415 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976)).
10 Ferrigno v. Ocean Transp., Ltd., 188 F. Supp. 179, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
" Though Congress cannot confer jurisdiction on article III courts to hear suits be-
tween aliens, see Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809); Montalet v. Murray,
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 46 (1807); Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800); Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320, 325 n.17 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on other
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eign involvement in a few sensitive domestic industries such as
shipping and minerals.2 2
B. Enactment of Section 1332(c)
Limiting corporate citizenship to the place of incorporation
succeeded all too well in expanding corporate access to the federal
courts. The usual justification for diversity jurisdiction is the fear
of local prejudice against non-local parties.23 However, a corpora-
tion that operated exclusively in one state might have incorporated
in another state for any number of reasons.24 For such a corpora-
tion, the usual justification for diversity jurisdiction was absent;
yet it retained access to federal courts in suits by or against citi-
zens of the state where it engaged in all of its business. Such a
company, if incorporated in-state, could settle similar disputes
only in the state courts.25 Similarly, a corporation could artificially
create diversity by the simple expedient of reincorporation in an-
other state. This potential for abuse of the place-of-incorporation
rule was recognized in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v.
grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983); Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1183 (7th Cir. 1980);
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 3604, at 607-08 (citing cases); Mahoney, A Historical
Note on Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 725 (1982), the Hodgson doctrine says
nothing about the power of Congress to grant citizenship. If section 1332(c) is applied to an
alien corporation, that corporation becomes an American citizen for diversity purposes and
Hodgson no longer applies. As the American Law Institute notes, there is no substantial
objection to granting citizenship to an alien corportion, if, as must be the case under the
principal-place-of-business test, it has a substantial presence. See ALI STUDY, supra note 3,
at 113 & n.14. As a general matter, citizenship is not defined anywhere in the Constitution,
and it has long been conceded that establishing qualifications for citizenship is a task dele-
gated exclusively to Congress. See Chirac v. Lessee of Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 268
(1817) (Marshall, C.J.); see also Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417-18 (1856).
2 In these industries, Congress required participating corporations to be United States
citizens and then defined corporate citizenship for purposes of this determination within the
industry. Vagts, The Corporate Alien: Definitional Questions in Federal Restraints on For-
eign Enterprise, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1489, 1502-08, 1524-50 (1961). Among the methods used
to define citizenship were the place of incorporation, the principal place of business, the
place where those with voting control were citizens, and the place of nationality of dominant
investors or management. Id.
23 See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
214 For example, a corporation might incorporate in another state in order to take ad-
vantage of the more liberal corporate laws of that state. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 9-15 (5th ed. 1982).
25 The Senate report accompanying the bill which became section 1332 described this
access as an "evil," noting that "[t]his circumstance can hardly be considered fair because it
gives the privilege of a choice of courts to a local corporation simply because it has a charter
from another State, an advantage which another local corporation that obtained its charter
in the home State does not have." S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in
1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3099, 3101-02 [hereinafter cited as 1958 SENATE
REPORT].
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Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,2 6 decided thirty years
before Congress acted to solve the problem. The spur which finally
brought Congress to correct this anomaly was a substantial in-
crease in the federal court workload due largely to diversity cases."'
One of a series of measures enacted by Congress in 1958 to reduce
the volume of diversity cases,28 section 1332(c) provided for corpo-
rate citizenship in both the state of incorporation and the state
where the corporation had its principal place of business. By creat-
26 276 U.S. 518 (1928). Plaintiffs, in order to get into federal courts, dissolved their
corporation in Kentucky and reincorporated in Tennessee, thereby creating the necessary
diversity. See id. at 523-24. Justice Brandeis took particular note of this case as an example
of abuse in his opinion for the Court in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73-74 (1938).
27 The Senate report points to the increase in the "judicial business of the United
States district courts," and in particular to the increase in diversity cases, as the problem
that Congress wished to address. The report notes that diversity cases
have increased from 7,286 in 1941 to 20,524 in 1956. A large portion of this caseload
involves corporations. Of the 20,524 diversity of citizenship cases filed in the district
courts during fiscal 1956 corporations were parties in 12,732 cases, or 62 percent. This
percentage is almost identical with the fiscal years 1951 and 1955.
1958 SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 2-3, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 3100. Special letters and reports printed in the Senate Report indicate that for the years
1950, 1951, and 1956, diversity cases involving a nonresident corporation doing business in
the state where the suit was filed made up over 57% of all diversity cases filed in each of
those years, and between 17 and 23% of total civil cases in these same years. Id. at 13-14,
reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3111 (statement of Division of Proce-
dural Studies and Statistics, Administrative Office of the United States Courts).
These figures were prepared in response to earlier phases of the legislation, which pro-
posed that corporations be entirely excluded from diversity jurisdiction. Therefore, they do
not indicate how many of the nonresident corporations had their principal place of business
in the state where the suit was filed. Nonetheless, rough estimates were made for the report
of the number of cases involving corporations chartered in one state with their principal
place of business in another. These figures indicated that "a small but substantial number
of cases will be affected" by defining corporations to be citizens of the state in which their
principal place of business is located. 1958 SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 14, reprinted
in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3112. Alien corporations were never mentioned or
statistically isolated.
" Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, §§ 1-5, 72 Stat. 415, 415-16 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1445 (1976)). This legislation also increased the jurisdictional amount
from $3,000 to $10,000, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1332(a) (1976), and eliminated removal
jurisdiction of state workmen's compensation cases. See id. § 1445(c).
The 1958 Act generated a decline of over 8,000 cases filed (from 25,709 in 1958 to 17,342
in 1959) in its first year. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS, 80-88 (1959) (attributing "decided drop" in civil filings
principally to Act of July 25). This decrease in diversity cases has been more than offset by
an increase in non-diversity cases in the ensuing years. Before 1958, diversity cases provided
a majority of all federal cases. See 1958 SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 13, reprinted in
1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3110. In 1958 diversity cases were 38% of all federal
civil cases filed. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
WORKLOAD STATISTICS 80 (1959). In 1959 this figure dropped to 30%, id., and by 1982 it had
dropped to 24%. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
WORKLOAD STATISTICS 10 (1983).
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ing dual citizenship, section 1332(c) denies diversity jurisdiction to
corporations whenever any opposing party is a citizen of either
state2 and prevents corporations from artificially creating diver-
sity by the simple act of reincorporation in a different state.
C. Application of Section 1332(c) to Alien Corporations
The effect of applying section 1332(c) to alien corporations is
simply stated. If section 1332(c) applies to alien corporations, a
corporation incorporated in France with its principal place of busi-
ness in New York cannot sue or be sued by a citizen of New York
in the federal courts based on diversity."0 It can, however, sue or be
sued in the federal courts by citizens of other states and, by virtue
of its New York citizenship, can perhaps sue other aliens.31 On the
other hand, if section 1332(c) does not apply to alien corporations,
the common law defining the citizenship of a corporation as its
state of incorporation remains in effect,32 and the hypothetical
French corporation can sue or be sued in the federal courts by citi-
zens of New York as well as of the other forty-nine states. How-
ever, it cannot then sue another alien based on diversity.3
Although commentators discussed the applicability of section
1332(c) to alien corporations soon after the provision was en-
acted,3 4 the first judicial decison to address the question was Ei-
29 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (complete diversity between
all plaintiffs and all defendants is required); supra note 15 and accompanying text.
30 There is no diversity of citizenship: both are citizens of New York for purposes of
section 1332.
31 For purposes of § 1332, the corporation would be a citizen of New York and there
would be diversity of citizenship with other aliens. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying
text. An interesting problem would arise where an alien corporation with its principal place
of business in the United States was party to a suit with another alien from the same coun-
try. Whether or not there is diversity jurisdiction in such a case is beyond the scope of this
comment, but the answer would appear to be no. In cases where two domestic corporations
have at least one of their two states of citizenship in common, such suits are routinely dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Diesing v. Vaughn Wood Prods., Inc., 175 F. Supp.
460 (W.D. Va. 1959); Harker v. Kopp, 172 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. IM. 1959); see also Moore &
Weckstein, supra note 15, at 1431 (any other result is inconsistent with the purposes of §
1332(c)). But see Majewski v. New York Cent. R.R., 227 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mich. 1964)
(where corporation has multiple citizenship due to multiple incorporation, plaintiff in one
state of incorporation can maintain a diversity suit); Fitzgerald v. Southern Ry., 176 F.
Supp. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (same).
3, See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
33 See Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809) (Congress cannot give the
courts jurisdiction over cases involving only aliens).
See, e.g., Note, 72 HARV. L. REV. 391, 394 (1958); Note, Congressional Patchwork in
Federal Jurisdiction, 6 UTAH L. Rav. 231, 239 (1958).
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senberg v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.38 In that case the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York held section 1332(c) inapplicable to alien corporations. The
court began by observing that "the statute differentiates between
States of the United States and foreign states by the use of a capi-
tal S for the word when applied to a State of the United States."3
The court noted further that in establishing a corporation's citi-
zenship in its state of incorporation, the statute refers only to a
corporation incorporated in a "State" of the United States, neces-
sarily a domestic corporation.3 7 Since section 1332(c) deems a cor-
poration a citizen "of any State by which it has been incorporated
and of the State where it has its principal place of business,""8 the
court concluded that the principal-place-of-business test applies
only to corporations which qualified as citizens under the state-of-
incorporation test, i.e., domestic corporations. 9 Other courts which
have followed the Eisenberg holding have repeated the capitaliza-
tion argument, adding to it the observation that the legislative his-
tory does not discuss alien corporations at any point.40
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
reached the opposite result in Southeast Guaranty Trust Co. v.
Rodman & Renshaw, Inc.41 That decision, and the cases which
have followed it, 42 disagreed with the Eisenberg court and found
"no ground for concluding that because the first half of the section
does not apply to foreign corporations . . the second half should
have no application to them at all.' '14 Moreover, these courts con-
tend, while it may be true that Congress gave no explicit consider-
:5 189 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
36 Id. at 502.
" Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
189 F. Supp. at 502.
40 See, e.g., Chemical Transp. Corp. v. Metropolitan Petroleum Corp., 246 F. Supp. 563,
566-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). In that case the court noted that, since Congress had already used
the words "State" and "state" to mean different things when it enacted § 1332(a) in 1948,
this legislative silence was particularly meaningful. Id.; accord Willems v. Barclays Bank
D.C.O., 263 F. Supp. 774, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp.,
246 F. Supp. 634, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 368 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1007 (1967).
41 358 F. Supp. 1001 (N.D. IlM. 1973).
42 E.g., Jerguson v. Blue Dot Inv., Inc., 659 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 946 (1982); Richmond Constr. Co. v. Hilb, 482 F. Supp. 1201 (M.D. Fla. 1980); Arab
Int'l Bank & Trust Co. v. National Westminster Bank, 463 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
4 Southeast Guar. Trust Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1001, 1006-07
(N.D. IM. 1973); accord Jerguson v. Blue Dot Inv., Inc., 659 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 946 (1982).
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ation to the effect of applying section 1332(c) to alien corporations,
its application better serves the purpose of limiting diversity juris-
diction that moved Congress to enact the statute."
Both positions are plausible. The bare statutory language is
ambiguous, and Congress certainly has the power to deem an alien
corporation a citizen of an American state.45 As courts advocating
the Eisenberg position have pointed out, the legislative history
does not indicate that Congress considered the application of sec-
tion 1332(c) to alien corporations. 6 On the other hand, as the
court in Southeast Guaranty argued, applying section 1332(c) to
alien corporations appears to be consistent with the overriding
congressional purposes behind the statute.47 Subsequent decisions
have added little to these initial positions,48 and courts remain di-
vided, even within single districts.49
Where a question concerning the applicability of a statute
arises, the starting point for analysis is the language of the statute
itself. If the question remains unresolved, one must then turn to
the legislative history and other indicia of congressional intent.
The statutory language, legislative history, and purposes of section
1332(c) provide no certain guidance as to the section's applicability
to alien corporations. Therefore, this comment will finally turn to
the general policies behind diversity jurisdiction to demonstrate
that section 1332(c) should not apply to alien corporations without
a much clearer statement from Congress.
44 E.g., Southeast Guar., 358 F. Supp. at 1006-07; Bergen Shipping Co. v. Japan Marine
Servs., Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 430, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
" See supra note 21.
46 See supra note 40 and accompanying text; infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
47 See supra note 44 and accompanying text; infra notes 69-72, 85 and accompanying
text.
4 See cases cited in MooRE's, supra note 4, 0.77[2.-3]; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
11, § 3628 at 824-29.
49 Compare Union Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. American Export Lines, 274 F. Supp. 123,
125 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) and Mazzella v. Pan Oceanica A/S Panama, 232 F. Supp. 29, 31 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (both holding § 1332(c) inapplicable) with Oppenheimer Reins. Co. v. Alex-
ander & Alexander, Inc., No. 79-2151, (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 1979) and Bergen Shipping Co. v.
Japan Marine Servs., Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 430, 431-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (both applying §
1332(c)).
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II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
A. Plain Language
The courts that deny the applicability of section 1332(c) to
alien corporations"0 begin by focusing on the capitalization of the
word "State." 51 The distinction between American "States" and
foreign "states" is made elsewhere in the statute,52 and the term
"States," as defined in section 1332(d), clearly refers only to mem-
bers of the United States." Therefore, these courts conclude, the
capitalized word "State" refers only to American states. Given this
conclusion, the only real question is whether incorporation in an
American state is a condition precedent to principal-place-of-busi-
ness citizenship in the United States. The argument in favor of
such an interpretation is quite straightforward. Section 1332(c)
consists of two clauses. The first deems a corporation a citizen of
"any State by which it has been incorporated, '54 while the second
adds corporate citizenship in "the State where it has its principal
place of business. ' 55 Since "State" refers only to constituents of
the United States, the first clause must refer to domestic corpora-
tions. If one assumes that the use of "the" and "it" in the second
clause is meant to refer to corporations included in the first clause,
the two clauses can be viewed as operating in conjunction with one
another; section 1332(c) adds to the citizenship of domestic corpo-
rations citizenship in the "State" of their principal place of busi-
ness. 6 This reading makes section 1332(c) inapplicable to alien
80 Capitalization, grammar and punctuation are infrequently used as aids in statutory
interpretation. 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.15, at 98
(C.D. Sands 4th ed. 1973). The traditional judicial view is that "[p]unctuation is a most
fallible standard by which to interpret a writing," Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 40, 53
(1837), and that "legislators are not presumed to be good grammarians." Travelers Indem.
Co. v. State, 57 Misc. 2d 565, 571, 293 N.Y.S.2d 181, 187 (Ct. Cl. 1968). The most recent
edition of Sutherland, however, suggests that rules of punctuation should be treated on a
par with other rules of interpretation. J. SUTHERLAND, supra.
81 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976).
81 "The word 'States,' as used in this section, includes the Territories, the District of
Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." Id. § 1332(d).
53 Id. § 1332(c) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
55 Assuming, of course, that the principal place of business is in the United States. If it
is not, the corporation has citizenship for diversity purposes only in its state of incorpora-
tion, since § 1332(c) is read to refer to the principal place of business worldwide rather than
just in the United States. See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
58 See Jerguson v. Blue Dot Inv., Inc., 659 F.2d 31, 32-35 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 946 (1982); Southeast Guar. Trust Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp.
1001 (N.D. I1. 1973).
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corporations; since they are explicitly excluded from the first
clause, they also must be excluded from the second.
Other courts have argued that the fact that "State" refers only
to one of the United States does not answer the real question:
whether the two clauses of 1332(c) operate to create citizenship to-
gether or independently. 57 The place-of-incorporation clause and
the principal-place-of-business clause may as easily be read as op-
erating independently. Under this reading, a corporation has suffi-
cient presence in a "State" to be deemed a "citizen" if it is incor-
porated in that "State," wherever its principal place of business
may be. Similarly, maintaining a principal place of business in one
of the "States" constitutes a sufficient presence for citizenship in
that "State," regardless of where the corporation is incorporated.
To abstract this point from the language of corporations and citi-
zenship, if a school teacher said that a child shall be considered a
member of any club by which that child has been accepted and of
the club where the child plays most often, frequent play would
make a child a member of a club even if the child had not been
accepted by any club or had joined a baseball team instead. The
word "the" in reference to the principal place of business is used
not to refer back to the state-of-incorporation clause, but simply
because there can be only one principal place of business.5 8
Choosing between these two readings of the statute by relying
on the language alone is difficult. As one court noted, the most one
can conclude with certainty is that "the statute itself does not pro-
vide adequate guidance."5 9 Moreover, reliance on such fine points
of syntax to determine the applicability of section 1332(c) to alien
corporations seems especially questionable in light of the many
ambiguities inherent in the section's phrasing.60 For instance, the
language of the section provides little help in ascertaining whether
the phrase "the State where [a corporation] has its principal place
of business" 61 refers to a corporation's principal place of business
57 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976) ("[A] corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any
State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of
business .... ." (emphasis added)).
" Jerguson v. Blue Dot Inv., Inc., 659 F.2d 31, 35 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
946 (1982).
59 See Southeast Guar. Trust Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1001, 1007
(N.D. IM. 1973).
60 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976).
" The definition of principal place of business is an issue of no small importance, even
if section 1332(c) is not applied to alien corporations, for any domestic corporation with its
principal place of business outside the United States will be affected by the answer. If sec-
tion 1332(c) is applied to alien corproations, this question becomes even more important, its
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in the United States, or worldwide.2 The answer appears to be the
worldwide principal place of business,"3 but such an interpretation
can only be reached by straining the statutory language which
speaks only of the "State" in which a corporation has its principal
place of business.
Another obvious flaw in the drafting of section 1332(c) was
pointed out by the court in Southeast Guaranty:
There are many instances in which the second half of section
1332(c) does not apply to United States corporations, i.e.,
where a corporation maintains its principal place of business
in the same state in which it is incorporated. Since it makes
no sense at all for a corporation to be twice a citizen of the
same state there must be read in at the end of the section, "if
the State of its principal place of business is different from
the State of its incorporation. "
The observation, while overly punctilious, again demonstrates that
the actual language of section 1332(c) is frequently ambiguous and
resolution will affect any alien corporation that does any business in the United States.
62 The courts have almost unanimously held that the statute refers to the principal
place of business worldwide. See, e.g., Roby v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 500 F. Supp. 480,
482 (D. Md. 1980); Arab Int'l Bank & Trust Co. v. National Westminster Bank, Ltd., 463 F.
Supp. 1145, 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Note, 22 H av. INVr'L'L.J. 688, 691 (1981). This view has
been adopted both in the decisions against applying section 1332(c) to alien corporations,
see, e.g., Eisenberg v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 189 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(alternate holding), and in the decisions for applying the statute to alien corporations. See,
e.g., Steinbock-Sinclair v. Amoco Int'l Oil Co., 401 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Ill. 1975). The conclu-
sion that Congress intended to use the principal place of business in the United States was
implied in dictum in Sansome v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., 228 F. Supp. 554, 555 (E.D.
La. 1964), but this dictum has been questioned, see Grimandi v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 512
F. Supp. 764, 773-74 (D. Kan. 1981) ("The Sansome court did not even address the issue
.... "); Arab Int'l Bank & Trust v. National Westminster Bank, 463 F. Supp. 1145, 1147
n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
In order to reach this conclusion, the courts have argued that the logic of dual citizen-
ship at the principal place of business is that the substantial presence of the corporation
results in little possibility of bias. This logic fails where the corporation's presence in the
State is miniscule, as it might be with either a domestic or alien corporation which had its
worldwide principal place of business abroad. Thus, it would be against the rationale of
section 1332(c) to apply the principal-place-of-business test to the United States principal-
place-of-business of an alien corporation. See, e.g., Roby, 500 F. Supp. at 482-83 (quoting
Eisenberg v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 189 F. Supp. 500, 502-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)).
13 358 F. Supp. at 1007.
"The cases and commentators have been unanimous in concluding that there was an
"absence of explicit Congressional consideration of the issue." Chemical Transp. Corp. v.
Metropolitan Petroleum Corp., 246 F. Supp. 562, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also Bergen
Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Japan Marine Servs. Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 430, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Southeast Guar. Trust Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1001, 1007 (N.D. Ill.
1973).
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that one must look beyond the face of the statute to determine
what it means.
B. Congressional Intent
1. Legislative History. The legislative history of the 1958 Act
indicates that Congress never considered the applicability of sec-
tion 1332(c) to alien corporations. 5 The examples of corporate
abuse of the diversity grant and the focus of the general discussion
in the Senate report concern domestic corporations. After noting
that the underlying purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to avoid
state court and state jury prejudice against non-local parties,6 the
Senate report states that diversity
was never intended to extend to local corporations which, be-
cause of a legal fiction, are considered citizens of another
State. It is a matter of common knowledge that such incorpo-
rations are primarily initiated to obtain some advantage tax-
wise in the State of incorporation or to obtain the benefits of
the more liberal provisions of the foreign State's corporation
laws. Such incorporations are not intended for the prime pur-
pose of doing business in the foreign State.6 7
Unlike the language of the statute, which may not be limited ex-
plicitly to American corporations, this language clearly refers to
domestic corporations.
2. Statutory Purposes. The legislative history of the 1958 Act
indicates that the goal of the entire Act was to "ease the workload
of our Federal courts by reducing the number of cases involving
corporations which come into Federal district courts on the
fictional premise that a diversity of citizenship exists." 8 Thus, the
statute's purposes were to reduce the federal caseload in diversity
and to avoid corporate abuse of the diversity grant.6 9
65 1958 SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 4, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 3102.
66 Id. at 3, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3101.
67 Id. (emphasis added).
6' See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
Richmond Constr. Corp. v. Hilb, 482 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (Applying
section 1332(c) will eliminate "the unfair advantage given the actually local, but fictionally-
foreign corporation."); Bergen Shipping Co. v. Japan Marine Servs., Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 430,
433 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("[I]t is clear that the same rationale which precludes out-of-state but
locally based corporations from invoking federal jurisdiction against locally incorporated
corporations would preclude alien, but locally based corporations, from invoking such juris-
diction."); Southeast Guar. Trust Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1001, 1007
(N.D. Ill. 1973) ("Congress sought to preclude any technical finding of diversity, when, in
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The congressional aim of avoiding abuse of diversity jurisdic-
tion by essentially local corporations that incorporate in another
state to gain access to the federal courts is equally applicable to
domestic and alien corporations. Whether an essentially local cor-
poration has incorporated in another state or in another country in
order to create diversity makes little difference.
Determining the effect on the federal caseload of applying the
statute to alien corporations is more difficult. In the case of domes-
tic corporations, the only effect of section 1332(c) is to reduce the
availability of diversity jurisdiction. Applied to alien corporations,
however, section 1332(c) creates United States citizenship for di-
versity purposes in the state in which the alien corporation has its
principal place of business, and hence may permit the alien corpo-
ration to sue another alien in the federal courts, a suit that, prior
to the enactment of section 1332(c), would not have been
allowed.70
That such suits may be brought is not yet established.7 1 If
fact, no such diversity existed ... .This rationale is no less compelling when applied to a
corporation which has been chartered in a foreign country but maintains its principal place
of business in the United States.").
70 See supra notes 32-33.
71 Some courts have denied jurisdiction on the grounds that both parties are aliens.
See, e.g., Ed & Fred, Inc. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underyriters Corp., 506 F.2d 757, 758 (5th
Cir. 1975); Neeld v. American Hockey League, 439 F. Supp. 459, 462 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Her-
cules, Inc. v. Dynamic Export Corp., 71 F.R.D. 101, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). This rule, however,
is inapplicable here, since section 1332(c) makes all corporations within its reach citizens of
the United States for diversity purposes. A suit by an alien corporation with its principal
place of business in the United States against another alien is therefore within the language
of the diversity grant under section 1332(a)(2). This type of case is distinguishable from
cases where there are aliens on both sides of a dispute with an American citizen as an addi-
tional party. Cf. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320, 325 n.17 (2d Cir.
1981) (no diversity jurisdiction under § 1332, but perhaps within Congress's power under
article HI), rev'd on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983); lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d
1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.) (same).
Other courts have sought to avoid this incidental increase in the availability of access to
federal courts via diversity by arguing that suits between alien corporations with their prin-
cipal place of business in the United States and other aliens lack complete diversity. See,
e.g., Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales, 629 F.2d 786, 790 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Grimandi v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 512 F. Supp. 764, 777
(D. Kan. 1981). A judicially created doctrine deriving from Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 267 (1806), complete diversity in its modem form requires that "each defendant
[be] a citizen of a different state from each plaintiff." Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kro-
ger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978); see also MooRE's, supra note 4, 1 0.75[1.-2], at 709.6-.7. Such
reasoning appears incorrect. The two parties are completely diverse because one has United
States citizenship and the other alien citizenship and therefore diversity would be created
under section 1332(a)(2), which provides for suits between "citizens of a State and citizens
or subjects of a foreign state." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976).
In support of these decisions, one can argue that insofar as the purpose of section 1332
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they cannot be brought, section 1332(c) will affect alien corpora-
tions and domestic corporations similarly, destroying diversity in
the state where the principal place of business is located and, as
some courts have recognized, 2 furthering the congressional pur-
pose of limiting diversity jurisdiction. Even if such suits can be
brought, the number of suits between citizens of the American
State which is an alien corporation's principal place of business
and the alien corporation (which would be denied diversity juris-
diction) likely exceeds the number of suits brought by an alien cor-
poration with a United States principal place of business against
another alien. Thus, applying section 1332(c) to alien corporations
appears consistent with Congress's purposes.
Additional support for the argument that applying section
1332(c) to alien corporations is consistent with the purposes be-
hind the statute may be found in the history of the proviso to sec-
tion 1332(c). 3 In 1964, Congress added this proviso, which estab-
lishes citizenship for an insurer in the state in which the insured is
a citizen, in order to eliminate diversity suits generated by state
direct-action statutes.74 The few cases that have dealt with the
treatment of alien insurers under the proviso have held it applica-
ble on the ground that to do so is consistent with the purposes of
the proviso as stated in its legislative history. 5
is to decrease the federal caseload, the alien corporation's dual citizenship should be used to
negate diversity whenever possible. Such a result achieves but a minimal reduction in the
number of diversity suits, however, and comes at the expense of making section 1332 even
more tortured.
71 See, e.g., Jerguson v. Blue Dot Inv., Inc., 659 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 946 (1982); Southeast Guar. Trust Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp.
1001 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
" The proviso reads:
Provided further, That in any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract
of liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the in-
sured is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of the
State of which the insured is a citizen, as well as of any State by which the insurer has
been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976).
74 These so-called direct action statutes had been enacted in Louisiana and Wisconsin.
Under the statutes, if one party to a controversy between two citizens of the same state was
insured by a non-local insurer, the other party could sue the insurer in federal court based
on diversity. As a result, the federal courts in these two jurisdictions were "flooded with
cases which normally would have been handled in the state courts." Torres v. Hartford Ins.
Co., 588 F.2d 848, 849 (lst Cir. 1978).
75 See Newsom v. Zurich Ins. Co., 397 F.2d 280, 282 (5th Cir. 1968); Narvaez v. British
Am. Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 1324, 1325 (D.P.R. 1971). The legislative history states that the
purpose of the amendment was
to eliminate under the diversity jurisdiction of the U.S. district courts, suits on certain
tort claims in which both parties are local residents, but which, under a State "direct
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The same argument can be made with reference to section
1332(c) as a whole. 6 However, section 1332(c) and its proviso are
aimed at different evils. Section 1332(c) was enacted to prevent
corporations from artificially creating diversity by the formality of
incorporation; 77 the proviso was enacted to prevent the use of di-
rect-action statutes to evade the complete-diversity rule. The pro-
viso thus has a narrower focus," a fact that vitiates the strength of
any inference to be drawn from the proviso for the application of
the general provisions of section 1332(c). 79 Moreover, direct-action
suits against alien insurers occur very rarely, and the fact that the
only two decisions regarding the proviso have both applied it to
alien corporations can hardly be taken to have settled the issue.O
The most that can be said is that the two decisions lend indirect
support to those federal courts that advocate applying section
1332(c) to alien corporations."1
action" statute, may be brought directly against a foreign insurance carrier without
joining the local tort-feasor as a defendant.
S. REP. No. 1308, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2778, 2778-79 [hereinafter cited as 1964 SENATE REPORT].
76 The division in the courts over the application of section 1332(c) to alien corpora-
tions had not developed when the proviso was enacted. Thus, no inferences as to actual
congressional intent can be drawn from the proviso or its legislative history on this issue.
The legislative history of the proviso, like that of section 1332(c) itself, is silent. See supra
notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
77 See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
7$ See 1964 SENATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 1-2, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 2778-79.
7' For example, an alien insurer would have less to fear from local prejudice in a suit
involving a local co-defendant insured than the typical alien corporation with a local princi-
pal place of business, since a decision adverse to the alien insurer would also be adverse to
the local party.
so The two cases cited above, see supra note 75, appear to be the only ones addressing
the aliplication of the proviso to alien corporations. The decisions themselves are less than
compelling. Newsom is a very brief per curiam opinion, while Narvaez is a similarly brief
order which simply cites and repeats what was already said in Newsom. See Narvaez, 324 F.
Supp. at 1325. Moreover, the reasoning of the decisions is less than compelling. In Newsom,
for example, the court argues that "Congress placed no artificial restraint concerning foreign
or alien states with a big S or a little s in its directions relating to insurers. The proviso
applies to 'any direct action against an insurer . . . whether incorporated or unincorpo-
rated.'" 397 F.2d at 282. Since Congress indeed used precisely the same big S and left out
precisely the same little a in the insurer provision as it did in the rest of section 1332(c), it is
difficult to see why the court feels that italicizing a couple of words allows it to reach a
different result.
S1 While the proviso is possibly distinguishable from the rest of section 1332(c), see
supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text, it is preferable to have the entire provision, the
body of section 1332(c) as well as the proviso, operate in a consistent manner. Thus, the
conclusion of the comment, that section 1332(c) should not be applied to alien corporations
without a clearer statement from Congress, applies to the proviso as well. To the extent that
the sparse existing caselaw and available indicia of congressional intent indicate otherwise, a
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Applying section 1332(c) to alien corporations thus appears to
further the ultimate goal of Congress in enacting the statute: re-
duction of the diversity caseload. Yet one must be careful not to
overemphasize the weight of this conclusion since the total number
of cases involving alien corporations is probably small.82 More im-
portantly, where, as here, Congress's actual intent is unknown, the
coincidence of consistency with congressional purposes must be
weighed against the counterintuitive and undesirable consequences
which may accrue from the application of a given statutory inter-
pretation. Section 1332(c) provides that "[flor the purposes of this
section" a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of the "State" in
which it is incorporated and the "State" in which it has its princi-
pal place of business.8 3 If, by negative implication, section 1332(c)
is read to be exclusive, no corporation can have access to federal
courts by virtue of diversity unless it is either incorporated or has
its principal place of business in an American "State. '84 Under
such a reading, an entirely alien corporation could never gain ac-
cess to federal courts based on diversity. This construction of sec-
tion 1332(c) would repeal, sub silentio, the grant of alienage juris-
diction codified in section 1332(a) . 5 Such a result could hardly
have been intended. Diversity jurisdiction is designed to secure an
impartial federal tribunal where fear of state court bias against
non-local parties is strong. It is unlikely that, in enacting section
1332(c), Congress intended to repeal such jurisdiction for the en-
tirely alien corporations that need its protection most 6 while pro-
viding that protection for alien corporations which have a signifi-
cant local presence. Furthermore, federal jurisdiction over suits
between aliens and United States citizens has been in force since
1789.87 Surely Congress would not have repealed such a longstand-
ing provision without any discussion in the legislative history.8
legislative clarification becomes all the more necessary.
82 No exact statistics are available. The Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, which compiles statistics of the federal judicial workload and breaks them down by
significant categories, does not publish a breakdown for suits involving aliens. See, e.g., AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CounTs, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATIS-
TICS (1983) (covering the year 1982); see also authorities cited supra note 27 (additional
statistics).
83 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976).
84 See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
85 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)-(4) (1976).
88 See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
87 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79 (current version codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1976)).
88 The legislative history of section 1332(c) is silent on the issue of its application to
alien corporations. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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In conclusion, the application of section 1332(c) to alien corpo-
rations would at best only minimally serve the purposes for which
it was enacted, while having apparently unintended consequences
for alienage jurisdiction. The next section explores the policies be-
hind alienage jurisdiction and assesses the consequences of apply-
ing section 1332(c) to alien corporations.
C. Policy Considerations
1. Diversity Jurisdiction, Bias, and Alien Corporations. The
basis for diversity jurisdiction is fear of local prejudice against
non-local parties."9 "Alienage jurisdiction . . . is founded on more
concrete concerns than the arguably unfounded fears of bias or
prejudice by forums in one of the United States against litigants
from another of the United States.""° The fear of bias against alien
individuals in state courts applies to corporations with an alien
charter as well.
According to the legislative history of section 1332(c), one rea-
son for the creation of dual corporate citizenship was that it was
"neither fair nor proper" for a corporation to avoid trial in the
courts of the state where it maintains its principal place of busi-
ness "by resorting to a legal device [non-local incorporation] not
available to the individual citizen." 91 Although this concern is valid
89 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 85. The most famous exposition of this view is
probably Chief Justice Marshall's in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 61 (1809):
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer justice as
impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is not less true that
the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions* on this subject, or views with
such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established
national tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen, or be-
tween citizens of different states.
Id. at 87; see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938); see also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347
(1816) (Story, J.). Professor David Currie has commented on the lack of empirical studies on
the existence of discrimination or fear of discrimination. D. CuRRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 252-53
& n.1 (3d ed. 1982). Furthermore, there are other situations in which the traditional justifi-
cation for diversity jurisdiction does not explain its operation; for example, a plaintiff may
sue a foreign defendant in federal court in the plaintiff's home state, even though he has no
grounds to fear prejudice in a state court action. Other justifications have been advanced:
for example, that the Constitution provided for diversity jurisdiction to encourage invest-
ment across state and regional boundaries. See Marbury, Why Should We Limit Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction?, 46 A.B.A. J. 379, 379-81 (1960); see also Frank, supra note 1, at 22-
28; Friendly, supra note 3, at 495-97; Phillips & Christenson, supra note 1, at 963-65.
,1 Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1980).
91 1958 SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 4, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 3102.
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with respect to domestic corporations and American citizens, the
considerations with respect to alien corporations and individuals
are significantly different. An alien individual, unlike a citizen of a
different state, has access to federal courts regardless of the length
of his residency or the nature of his activity within the state.92
Long or indefinite residence by an alien individual is analogous to
maintenance of a principal place of business by an alien corpora-
tion. Just as the principal place of business reflects the corpora-
tion's local character and the corresponding decrease in alien char-
acter, the domicile of the individual reflects the individual's
attachment to the American state, with a similar decrease in alien
character. In the case of the individual, however, the mere exis-
tence of an alien identification suffices to justify continued access
to federal courts through diversity.
A genuinely foreign element-the foreign charter- distin-
guishes alien corporations from domestic corporations. For the
alien corporation, as much as for the alien individual, a tie to a
foreign government is an important factor justifying continued ac-
cess to federal courts.93 In Eisenberg v. Commercial Union Assur-
ance Co.,94 the court responded to this claim with a hypothetical.
If a Bahamian corporation has its principal place of business in
New York, the court contended, "the inference is legitimate that it
has adopted New York as its actual residence and that it is no
longer entitled to be considered an outsider and to deserve the
protection accorded outsiders. 9 5 This example is deceptive, be-
cause the Bahamas convey a neutral political tone to most Ameri-
cans. If the corporation were chartered in a particularly controver-
sial country, such as South Africa, Argentina, Israel, or Libya, the
possibility of prejudice would be greater regardless of the "local"
character of the corporation or its principal place of business. The
possibility of prejudice would exist simply because of the foreign
charter. A domestic corporation owned, controlled, or chartered
92 See C.H. Nichols Lumber Co. v. Franson, 203 U.S. 278, 282-83 (1906); Breedlove v.
Nicolet, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 413, 431 (1833); Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1183 (7th Cir.
1980); Psinakis v. Psinakis, 221 F.2d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 1955).
93 Of course, an individual can only be in one place at a time while a corporation can
maintain a real presence in numerous locations. This fact is irrelevant insofar as the focus is
on the existence of a legitimate foreign element. The contact between the corporation and
the foreign government created by virtue of foreign incorporation is the operative fact, re-
gardless of the scope of the corporation's other activities.
" 189 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 35-39
and accompanying text.
91 189 F. Supp. at 502.
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out-of-state need no longer fear prejudice in modern America;98
bias against at least some foreigners has not yet dissipated
completely.
2. Alien Corporations and Foreign Relations. Sensitivity to-
ward potential biases against aliens is deeply rooted in American
history. Hamilton wrote in The Federalist that "the federal judici-
ary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of
other countries are concerned. '97 Early Supreme Court cases also
recognized the unique nature of suits involving foreigners and the
consequent necessity of providing a federal forum.9 8 Hamilton's
concern was not so much for the individual party as for the govern-
ment that recognizes that party as a citizen.99 Similarly, the Ameri-
can Law Institute ("ALI") concludes that "[i]t is important in the
relations of this country with other nations that any possible ap-
pearance of injustice or tenable ground for resentment be
avoided." 100 The ALI noted that one way of avoiding friction with
foreign governments is to provide an alien with "the assurance that
he can have his cases tried in a court with the best procedures the
federal government can supply and with the dignity and prestige of
the United States behind it."10 1 Other commentators have taken
care to distinguish alienage jurisdiction when questioning the vir-
tues of diversity jurisdiction.0 2 This sensitivity towards aliens, the
product of fears of bias and fears of offending foreign governments,
has been reflected in recent legislative efforts to alter or restrict
diversity jurisdiction. Alienage jurisdiction has consistently been
distinguished and retained.' 5
" Broussard v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 398 F.2d 885, 889 n.5 (5th Cir. 1968)
("[T]he anachronistic belief that federal jurisdiction will treat out-of-state individuals or
corporations more fairly than state processes simply does not hold validity in an era when
rapid transportation and communication have made us citizens of a nation rather than sub-
jects of local bigotry.").
:7THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 517 (A. Hamilton) (E.M. Earle ed. 1941).
'8 See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335 (1816) (Story, J.).
:9 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 97, at 516-18.
100 ALI STUDY, supra note 3, at 108.
101 Id. The general ALI argument for the retention of diversity has special force in
alienage cases:
Ever since 1789 the federal government has pledged to travelers away from their home
states the even-handed justice of its own courts. This pledge is so woven into the fabric
of our society that it is taken for granted. It should not lightly be withdrawn. General
diversity jurisdiction should be retained unless it can be asserted with confidence that
the shortcomings of state court justice which originally gave rise to it no longer exist to
any significant degree.
Id. at 106; see also C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 93.
102 See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, supra note 3, at 149-50; Currie, supra note 2, at 8.
103 See, e.g., 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 27 (testimony of Rep. Kastenmeier) (ex-
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Foreign governments have an economic and sometimes a polit-
ical stake in the fortunes of corporations chartered in their coun-
tries. The possibility that in some instances neither bias nor fear of
offending a foreign government may exist does not mean that all or
even most corporations with alien charters should be restricted in
their access to federal courts. Determining the likelihood of bias or
of offending a foreign government as well as the potential effects
on foreign trade and commerce is a task appropriate for Congress
and beyond the competence of a court.11 4 Unfortunately, Congress
did not consider these factors when it enacted section 1332(c). 0 5
The importance of these matters, when combined with the inabil-
ity of courts to assess them, supports the exclusion of alien corpo-
rations from section 1332(c) without a clearer statement from Con-
gress of a contrary intention.
3. Applying the Principal-Place-of-Business Test. The princi-
pal-place-of-business test has been difficult to apply to American
corporations, °6 especially to large, diffuse corporations conducting
business in many states.0 7 This determination can only become
more difficult, and hence more likely to produce controversial re-
sults, if applied to alien corporations. Intricate corporate arrange-
ments and doctrines such as piercing the corporate veil only add to
the difficulty.l08 The legislative history of section 1332(c) indicates
that Congress thought the principal-place-of-business test had
"ample precedent" in the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act and
plaining that H.R. 9622, a proposed bill to abolish diversity jurisdiction, would preserve it
"in the case of the true alien, the foreign citizen or foreign national or foreign state").
104 In Chemical Transp. Corp. v. Metropolitan Petroleum Corp., 246 F. Supp. 563
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), the court responded to the argument that applying section 1332(c) to alien
corporations is consistent with the overriding congressional purposes for the statute by ex-
plaining that
if § 1332(c) is to apply to alien corporations, it is for Congress and not this Court to so
provide. In making such a determination, Congress may not consider the policy reasons
supporting the enactment of § 1332(c) controlling. Congress, for example, might wish
to determine. . . whether applicability of § 1332(c) to alien corporations would have a
negative effect on foreign trade or commerce ....
Id. at 567 (citation omitted); see also Salomon Englander Y Cia Ltda. v. Israel Discount
Bank, Ltd., 494 F. Supp. 914, 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("[U]nique policy considerations relevant
to foreign corporations may come into play which Congress is best suited to address.").
'o' See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
" See D. CURRIE, supra note 89, at 332-34; C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, § 27, at 103-05;
Currie, supra note 2, at 36-39.
107 In such cases the factual determination of which state is the principal place of busi-
ness can become extremely complex. 1958 SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 4, reprinted in
1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3102 (discussing how § 1332(c) will work differently as
applied to corporations which do business over a large number of states).
108 See, e.g., Grimandi v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 512 F. Supp. 764, 769 (D. Kan. 1981).
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cases construing them.10 9 Yet the principal-place-of-business test
of the Bankruptcy Act applied only to domestic corporations, "
and Congress gave no guidance as to whether or how the principal
place of business of alien corporations should be determined.
Given the special concerns that arise in cases involving alien corpo-
rations, the decision to extend the principal-place-of-business de-
termination required by section 1332(c) to suits involving alien
corporations ought only to be embarked upon after a weighing of
policy, for which Congress and not the courts is best suited.
Congress has adopted statutes conferring jurisdiction on fed-
eral courts for suits involving corporations connected with particu-
lar industries, such as shipping,111 where foreign incorporation
presented a problem.1 1 2 If Congress decides that a selective, indus-
try-oriented approach is insufficient to prevent abuse of alien in-
corporation, it can easily enact rules for evaluating the extent to
which an alien charter truly reflects alien interests. On the other
hand, Congress could choose to apply section 1332(c) to alien cor-
porations. The question is not whether Congress could or should so
choose but whether it has already chosen. The fact that Congress
has enacted statutes providing jurisdiction for alien corporations in
specific industries, when combined with the seeming undesirability
of the method provided for doing so in section 1332(c), militates
against so concluding.
In enacting section 1332(c), Congress sought to deny diversity
jurisdiction in situations in which a corporation's local presence
made the diversity grant unnecessary. " Where alien corporations
lo9 1958 SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 5, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 3102. Cases construing the test are listed in the appendix to Kelly v. United States
Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 855 (3d Cir. 1960). Professor Moore commented that "[a]mple
precedent there was, but consistent precedent there was not." Moore & Weckstein, supra
note 15, at 1439.
110 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(1), 30 Stat. 544, 545, § 2 (repealed 1978)
(distinguishing bankrupts "who have had their principal place of business... within their
respective territorial jurisdictions" from bankrupts "who do not have their principal place of
business, reside, or have their domicile within the United States, but have property within
their jurisdictions or who have been adjudged bankrupts by courts of competent jurisdiction
without the United States, and have property within their jurisdictions. .. ").
"' Merchant Marine (Jones) Act of 1920, ch. 250, 41 Stat. 988 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.). The same sorts of potential abuses exist in Jones Act cases
as in diversity cases: a shipowner may seek foreign registration to avoid American law. The
courts have avoided such abuses by "disregarding paper mach6 formalities of nominal for-,
eign registration" on a case-by-case basis as the need arises. Tsakonites v. Transpacific Car-
riers Corp., 246 F. Supp. 634, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); see also Bartholomew v. Universe Tank-
ships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000 (1959).
'1' See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
'1' See 1958 SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 3-4, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 3101-02.
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are involved, the principal-place-of-business test does not take into
account the alien character of a corporation. Indeed, it entirely
fails to address the issue.
CONCLUSION
Congress's actual intent with respect to the application of sec-
tion 1332(c) to alien corporations remains unclear. The language of
the provision can be read to support its application to alien corpo-
rations, and applying the provision is consistent with Congress's
overriding purposes. At the same time, there are strong arguments
against applying section 1332(c) to alien corporations. The lan-
guage of the provision is far from clear, and a reading that bars the
application of the provision to alien corporations is certainly de-
fensible. Moreover, a literal reading of section 1332(c) produces re-
sults unlikely to have been intended by Congress. It is fairly clear
that Congress did not even consider the matter, and there are nu-
merous and weighty policy considerations suggesting that if Con-
gress had considered it, Congress might well have excluded alien
corporations from the ambit of section 1332(c).
The decision whether section 1332(c) does or does not apply to
alien corporations is one to be made by Congress and not the
courts. The continuing division of the federal courts on this issue
suggests the need for a legislative solution. In the absence of a
clear legislative statement, section 1332(c) should not be applied to
alien corporations.
Marc Miller
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